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Catholicism and Liberalism, edited by R. Bruce Douglass and David 
Hollenbach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xv and 352. 
PAUL J. WEITHMAN, University of Notre Dame 
The subject of this book is the possibility that Catholicism and liberalism 
might "discover that something constructive can come of engaging one 
another over their differences" (p. 7, emphasis original). The book's treat-
ment of this subject is interdisciplinary: contributors include distinguished 
moral and systematic theologians, Catholic historians, political scientists, 
an eminent Catholic ecclesiologist, a canon lawyer and the senior religion 
correspondent of the New York Times. Their essays are uniformly clear, lit-
erate, erudite and extremely interesting and scholars interested in any of 
the disciplines represented will find that Catholicism and Liberalism amply 
repays their study. 
Scholars of philosophy, however, will find the book perplexing. If its 
contents are an accurate indication, the meetings from which Catholicism 
and Liberalism resulted did not include philosophers. Various of the essays 
in the book address philosophical themes, but none focuses on the concep-
tual problems that are the staples of political philosophy. These omissions 
seem puzzling in light of the book's subtitle, according to which the vol-
ume anthologizes "contributions to American public philosophy" (empha-
sis added). They seem especially so given the book's point of departure. 
Catholicism and Liberalism is premised on the claims that momentous 
changes have taken place in the Catholic church since Vatican II and that 
those changes make intellectual encounters between Catholicism and liber-
alism both imperative and fruitful (pp. 9ff.). But the thirty years since the 
council have also seen momentous changes in Anglophone political philos-
ophy, including the resurgence of liberalism in a very powerful form. The 
possibility of mutually beneficial contact between Catholicism and liberal-
ism therefore seems to depend upon the possibility that Catholic social 
thought can advance the discussion of questions now outstanding in liber-
al theory. Yet none of the essays in this volume surveys those questions in 
a systematic way. 
It would be a mistake to conclude that the book's constituent essays lack 
philosophical interest or that its omissions of philosophers and of the sus-
tained discussion of philosophical questions are unjustified. To appreciate 
the philosophical import of the essays and to understand what initially 
seem glaring omissions, it is necessary to grasp the philosophically inter-
esting and contentious assumptions that underlie the conversation to 
which Catholicism and Liberalism is a contribution. I therefore want to eluci-
date those assumptions before turning attention to any of the essays. 
Those assumptions are best brought to light by examining the notion of 
"public philosophy" mentioned in the subtitle of Catholicism and Liberalism, 
for contemporary political philsophers may find it unfamiliar. Examining 
that notion, in turn, requires imputing to the editors of Catholicism and 
Liberalism an idea that is not explicitly discussed in the book but is central 
to the way Hollenbach and Douglass conceive of its purpose. The idea is 
that of a "public consensus". That idea, together with the companion idea 
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of a "public philosophy", plays a crucial role in the political writings of 
John Courtney Murray, the great Jesuit liberal who died in 1967. The fact 
that Murray's words grace the frontispiece of the volume under review, 
open Douglass's "Introduction" and are prominently cited in Hollenbach's 
conclusion together suggest that this volume's editors believe themselves 
faithful to the spirit of Murray's project. Their fidelity in its turn raises the 
possibility that Murray's idea of a public consensus is as important to them 
as it was to him. 
The following six features of the public consensus are crucial to that 
notion as Murray conceived it. 1 
0) Matters of public concern and discussion. The public consensus has 
propositions as its objects. Among those propositions are some which 
express claims about what constitutes a society's public life and thus about 
what matters fall within the proper scope of public concern and discussion. 
Among these matters of public concern are education, the operations of 
government and of political institutions generally, the content and dissemi-
nation of popular and high culture, the integrity of the family, the opera-
tion institutions which distribute wealth, the extent of compliance with tra-
ditional morality and the state of public discussion itself. 
(2) Moral consensus. Also among the objects of consensus are the propo-
sitions that certain values are to be realized and moral principles satisfied 
in the various areas of public concern and discussion. These include prin-
ciples of justice, ideals of civility and reasonability, aesthetic values, and 
values associated with a virtuous citizenry and with proper respect for 
human sexuality. 
(3) Moral and religious pluralism. Public consensus does not require con-
sensus on a moral theory or religious view which imposes systematic unity 
upon these values and principles. Neither does it require consensus on a 
systematic conception of political morality of the sort that Rawls defends.2 
Instead, a public consensus is consistent with a moral consensus of the sort 
(2) describes together with disagreement about how the objects of the 
moral consensus are theoretically unified. 
(4) Dynamism of the public consensus. Social change continually confronts 
the public with new challenges in the areas of public concern. On-going 
public discussion of those challenges is on-going public discussion about 
how the values and principles on which there is moral consensus are to be 
applied to and realized in new situations. Changes in culture and mores 
also demand public discussion of how the moral consensus might be 
altered or reshaped. 
(5) Norms of public discussion. This on-going public discussion is gov-
erned by norms requiring civility and courtesy of discussion and serious 
consideration of alternative points of view. These are moral rather than 
legal norms, and are themselves objects of the public consensus. As 
Murray conceived ideal public discussion, it need not approximate egali-
tarian deliberative ideals like the "ideal of deliberative democracy" or the 
social contracU Rather, Murray thought that the discussion which forms, 
applies and extends the public consensus ought accord a special role to 
intellectual elites.4 
(6) The public philosophy. A society's public philosophy is a subset of its 
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public consensus. It includes the norms, values and ideals to be realized or 
satisfied in its public life, including its public discussion. Because it is a 
part of society's public consensus and because the public consensus is 
dynamic, the public philosophy is dynamic, and grows through public dis-
cussion which privileges intellectual elites and is governed by norms of 
civility. 
Murray published his We Hold These Truths in 1960 as a contribution to 
American public philosophy so conceived. The editors of the book under 
review published Catholicism and Liberalism thirty-five years later with the 
same purpose in mind. Its task is to consider whether Catholicism can 
now contribute to the public consensus and public philosophy of the 
United States. That public philosophy is, they think, identifiably liberal but 
is not identical to any of the liberal theories now current in departments of 
philosophy. This explains their exclusion of professional philosophers. 
Philosophical theories like those of Rawls and Dworkin are not the public 
philosophy to which Douglass and Hollenbach think Catholicism can con-
tribute or which they think Catholics can accept on their own grounds. 
They are, rather, alternatives to Catholic liberalism which attempt to 
inform public philosophy in different ways than Douglass, Hollenbach and 
their contributors hope to do. The editors exclude systematic consideration 
of these philosophicalliberalisms because they judge it more important to 
determine what contribution Catholicism can make to American public 
philosophy than to compare it with its rivals. 
To see that this is the book's purpose, note that taking it as such explains 
the book's contents as well as its omissions. The natural way to determine 
what contribution Catholicism can make to a liberal public philosophy 
would be to raise historical and theological questions about Catholicism's 
previous encounters with liberal political thought and practice, its credibil-
ity as a contributor to liberal discussion in light of its internal governance, 
and its ability to adopt and adapt concepts like rights which are central to 
liberalism. These are just the areas of inquiry that contributors to 
Catholicism and Liberalism explore, and explore very well. The splendid 
essays by Peter Steinfels, Philip Gleason and Joseph Komonchak survey 
Catholicism's encounters with European and American liberalism from the 
late 18th-century to Vatican II. Essays on Catholicism and feminism, on 
Catholic teaching about the family and on the rights of persons in the 
Church-by Mary Segers, Laura Gellot and canon lawyer James Provost, 
respectively-consider areas in which Catholicism might seem most vul-
nerable to liberal critique. They therefore consider, in effect, why 
Catholicism might lack credibility as liberalism's interlocutor. 
The two most outstanding essays in this collection are those by David 
Tracy and David Hollenbach. In the former, Tracy argues that classics of 
Catholic thought have an inherently "public" character. Despite their 
explicitly Catholic origin, imagery and language, they convey messages 
that can be received by anyone who encounters them, whether Catholic or 
not (pp. 202~3). It follows, Tracy argues, that the introduction of religious 
classics into public discussion is not the illicit introduction of privately 
accessible premises into an argment that ought to be based only on public 
ones. It is rather the presentation of art that is religious in origin to a plu-
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ralistic society whose members are capable of learning from it. Thus Tracy 
argues that if liberals accept the notion of a classic as a work of art that can 
be publicly received whatever its origins, they will be committed to a less 
restrictive view of how the public consensus grows than they typically 
endorse.' In the latter essay, Hollenbach argues for the compatibility of 
Catholicism with rights understood as guarantees of "the minimum condi-
tions for life in community" (pp. 138ff.). The essay leaves some crucial 
questions unanswered, and readers must refer to Hollenbach's 
"Afterword" (pp. 323-43) to understand the meaning of "community". 
The ellipses in Hollenbach's argument are, however, matters of necessity, 
for the essay builds on fifteen years of his work.6 They should not obscure 
the essay's achievement and its very important contribution to this vol-
ume. By arguing for a conception of rights that entails some of the inter-
personal duties central to liberal theory, Hollenbach shows that 
Catholicism shares enough of liberalism's language and commitments to 
make common cause on some issues and to contribute to the growth of a 
liberal public consensus. But by defending a notion of rights that is incon-
sistent with certain claims about personal autonomy which secular liberals 
often endorse, Hollenbach shows that Catholicism maintains sufficient crit-
ical distance from liberalism to retain its integrity. 
If reading Catholicism and Liberalism as a continuation of Murray's pro-
ject explains its contents, this interpretation also points to the book's short-
comings. There are serious problems with Murray's conception of and 
contribution to American public philosophy; those problems infect the 
book under review. I now turn to three of those difficulties. 
First, why think there is a public consensus and a public philosophy in 
the United States? Murray would argue that postulating a public consen-
sus is necessary to explain salient features of American political life. To the 
extent that there is a continuous tradition of appeal to certain values and 
principles in political argument, to the extent that political discussion is 
conducted and resolved with reasonable civility in the face of pluralism, to 
the extent that citizens recognize what constitutes their public life, Murray 
would say, there must to that extent be a public consensus. The problem 
with this argument is that the notion of a public consensus would be 
extremely difficult to define and operationalize. There may therefore be 
both conceptual and empirical difficulties with Murray's claim that the 
notion of a public consensus plays the role in social scientific explanation 
he supposed.? Moreover, even if the best explanations of American politics 
would have postulated a public consensus in Murray's time, it is far from 
clear that they would do so now or, if they would, what the contents of the 
postulated consensus would be. For the sake of completeness, Catholicism 
and Liberalism should include an essay on what it is Americans believe late 
in the 20th century and what evidence there is that they believe it. 
Second, it is questionable whether Murray's claims about the formation 
and growth of public philosophy are still true. It may have been true in 
Murray's time that the terms of public discussion and the growth of the 
public consensus were determined by "careful university professors, the 
reasoned opinions of specialists, the statements of responsible journalists, 
and the solid pronouncements of respected politicians".8 But lowered stan-
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dards of education, the increased use of FAX and electronic mail by politi-
cal pressure groups, the American and British electorates' repudiations of 
large, centrally-planned and -governed welfare states, the advent of sound-
bite political journalism and the gradual eclipse of the printed word as the 
medium of mass political communication all suggest the marginalization 
of the intellectual elites George Will once dubbed lithe theory class".9 They 
therefore suggest that the terms of American public debate about, for 
example, welfare reform, health care or gun control, are now set quite dif-
ferently than Murray claimed a generation ago. It follows that if Murray 
were alive today, he might find it difficult to influence American public 
philosophy as he did in 1960. This raises questions about how a book like 
the one under review can influence American public philosophy, as its 
subtitle promises it will. The volume collects between two covers the work 
of America's leading Catholic liberal intellectuals. It says nothing about 
the mechanisms by which their work can influence the large number of 
Americans who do not read books like Catholicism and Liberalism. 
How is the extremely impressive, and distinctively Catholic, liberalism 
of this book to gain the public's attention and shape its consensus? One 
obvious answer is that the tenets of Catholic liberalism might seep into 
American Catholic culture via their incorporation into preaching and study 
groups of church documents like the American bishops' pastoral on the 
economy. The problem with this answer is suggested by the facts that in 
the last twenty-five years, the church attendance of American Catholics has 
fallen and their attitudes to abortion and artificial contraception have 
become comparable to those of their non-Catholic compatriots. Thus the 
events which made this book's encounter between Catholicism and liberal-
ism possible occurred just as American Catholics were becoming decreas-
ingly attached to their church and increasingly selective about which of its 
teachings they accept. This suggests that the liberalization of American 
Catholics since Vatican II makes them less likely than they were in 
Murray's time to attend to the distinctively Catholic liberalism their church 
should now endorse if the conclusions of Catholicism and Liberalism are true. 
The implications of this suggestion are unwelcome to those of us who con-
sider ourselves Catholic liberals. Perhaps the suggestion is incorrect. 
Whether it is, and how works like this one can shape the public consensus, 
should themselves be addressed by essays in this book. 
The most serious problem with Murray's notion of a public consensus is 
the moral role he assigns it. Murray recognized that public and private 
institutions which regularly impinge on areas of public concern require 
legitimation. He thought that the public philosophy, together with civil 
dialogue based upon it, provide what legitimacy these institutions enjoy. 
Crudely put, Murray thought public action legitimate only if civil public 
discussion could show it consistent with or required by the public philoso-
phy.lO Clearly this condition, together with the privileged role of inteIIectu-
al elites in the formation of the public philosophy, commit Murray to a 
conservative and elitist conception of legitimacy. His conception ignores 
the possibility that the composition of elites and the terms of their consen-
sus are themselves the result of historical processes that are morally illegiti-
mate because oppressive or exclusionary of women, minorities and the 
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otherwise marginalized. It therefore ignores just the worries that lead 
some contemporary philosophers to engage in feminist critiques of extant 
power structures, others to despair of legitimacy in the spirit of Foucault, 
and still others to define it by reference to the ideal and egalitarian forms of 
democratic deliberation I mentioned earlier. 
This problem with Murray's project affects Catholicism and Liberalism as 
well. Many of the essays in this book challenge American liberalism by 
challenging the autonomy and social atomism that permeate American life. 
But, with the exception of Hollenbach's essay and afterword, the book is 
insufficiently critical of historic restrictions on participation in important 
political or religious discussions. Even the essays where such criticism 
would be expected-those on feminism and on the rights of persons in the 
church-are remarkably restrained. The book is therefore insufficiently 
attentive to the ways in which what consensus there now is in either 
America or American Catholicism might reflect restrictions on who was 
permitted to speak in the first place. Perhaps there were no such restric-
tions, perhaps what restrictions there were are justifiable, or perhaps there 
are important and principled distinctions to be drawn among them; with-
out their careful examination, we cannot be sure. It is here that the omis-
sion of contemporary political philosophy from this volume exacts its high-
est price. The theory of democratic liberalism, as articulated in contempo-
rary American philosophy, is thoroughly committed to egalitarian ideals of 
deliberation. Its inclusion would usefully have balanced this otherwise 
splendid collection. 
NOTES 
1. For these six features, I draw primarily upon John Courtney Murray, 
SJ, We Hold These Truths (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960) pp. 79-123, but 
also on other passages in the book. For some of Murray's thoughts on morality 
and the conditions of culture, for example, see pp. 155-74. For his thoughts on 
the ideal of civility, see pp. 5ff. 
2. See John Rawls Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1993). 
3. For the ideal of deliberative democracy, see Cass Sunnstein The Partial 
Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); for the social 
contract as a deliberative ideal, see my "Contractualist Liberalism and 
Deliberative Democracy" (Philosopliy and Public Affairs 24 (1995): 314-343.). 
4. See Murray, op. cit., p. 103. 
5. Thus Tracy's emphasis on the reception of classic works of art might 
be contrasted with Rawls's claim that "all ways of reasoning [. .. J must 
acknowledge certain common elements: the concept of judgment, principles of 
inference and rules of evidence, and much else, otherwise they would not be 
ways of reasoning but perhaps rhetoric or means of persuasion. We are con-
cerned with reason, not simply with discourse." See his op. cit., p. 220. 
6. See David Hollenbach, SJ Claims in Conflict: Retrieving and Renewing the 
Catholic Human Rights Tradition (New York: Paulist Press, 1979). 
7. As it is a matter of scholarlv debate whether the notion of civic culture 
has the explanatory power its proponents contend. For this crucial notion, see 
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton 
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University Press, 1963); for criticisms of Almond and Verba, see Alasdair 
MacIntyre "The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts" Ethics 84 
(1973) 1-9; Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Civic Culture and 
Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships" American Political Science 
Review 88 (1994): 635-52. 
8. Murray, op. cit., p. 103. 
9. George Will "Conservatism and Character" in his The Morning After 
(New York: The Free Press, 1986), pp. 365-68, p. 365. 
10. See Murray, op. cit., pp. 103ff. In these passages, Murray relies upon 
Adolph A. Berle, Jr. Power Without Property (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
World, 1959), pp. 98-116, where the issue of legitimacy is more explicitly 
addressed than in his own discussion. 
Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?, by Norman Malcolm, edited 
with a response by Peter Winch. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1994. Pp. xi and 140. $30.50 (Cloth). 
RONALD E. HUSTWIT, The College of Wooster. 
This work of Norman Malcolm is more a lengthy essay than a book. It 
was, according to Peter Winch's "Preface," Malcolm's last complete piece 
of philosophical work before his death. Winch believes that Malcolm did 
want it published, but that he would have worked on it more before sub-
mitting it. Because of its length, about 94 pages, the publisher requested 
that Winch add commentary in order to bring it to book length. In his 
commentary, Winch has "sharp disagreements" with Malcolm's claims. I 
will not discuss those disagreements in this review. I will say that 
Winch's commentary adds the aspect of an on-going philosophical dia-
logue to the book and that his objections seem carefully made, accurate, 
and strong. Nevertheless, Malcolm's thesis is quite interesting, and I 
would not have him withdraw it for Winch's objections. 
Malcolm, then, has written another book on themes in his teacher's 
work. This one compares Wittgenstein's thinking to the kind of thinking 
that religious people do when actually living and talking in "a religious 
point of view." According to Malcolm, this is meant to be an analogy. It 
is not that Wittgenstein takes up religious themes or discusses religious 
language. Rather, there is something about his thought that reminds 
Malcolm of the way in which religious people think. Malcolm then 
interprets the following remark of Wittgenstein according to his under-
standing and comparison of how religious people think to 
Wittgenstein's phiIosphy. The remark is quoted from a conversation 
with M. O'c. Drury: "I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing 
every problem from a religious point of view" (Rush Rhees editor, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Personal Recollections, p. 94). Malcolm's question is: 
What did Wittgenstein mean by this remark? 
A quick glance at the book would seem to indicate that the subject 
matter was Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. After a chapter in 
which Malcolm puts Wittgenstein forward as having said or written cer-
tain things which show that he was in fact thoughtful about religion, the 
